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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STEPHEN FRANK HYDE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs-
LAURI LEE HYDE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Case No. 
11463 
This is a divorce action which was commenced in Jan-
uary, 1968, by the Plaintiff (respondent) Stephen Frank Hyde, 
against the defendant (appellant) Lauri Lee Hyde. The plain-
tiff sought custody of the minor child of the parties and an 
equitable distribution of the property. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Many hours of testimony, evidence, and arguments 
having been received and considered, the trial court entered 
it's decree that the plaintiff be granted a divorce from the 
defendant and that the plaintiff be awarded the care, custody, 
and control of the parties' minor child subject to the defend-
ant's right of reasonable and liberal visitation. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff seeks to have the decision of the lower 
court affirmed, and to recover his costs incurred as a result of 
this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff essentially agrees with the statement of 
facts as set forth in the defendant's brief. However, there are 
a few points which plaintiff feels need to be corrected and 
clairified. 
The defendant left the home of the parties on Novem-
ber 2, 1967, "to go to Phoenix for a vacation for two weeks." 
(TR. p. 118, 2-4) She had stated that her family obligations 
were getting too much for her, and that she was under such 
stress that she had to get away for a couple of weeks. (TR. p. 
117, 30 and TR. p. 118, 1-2) She indicated that at the time 
she felt that she was losing all identity, and that no one really 
cared too much about her, or what happened to her, or what 
she did. (TR. p. 5, 20-24 ). 
When the defendant left for her two-week vacation, 
she had not made arrangements for the care of the minor 
child. The subject had been discussed by the parties, but the 
plaintiff was actually left with the full responsibility to make 
any arrangements for the care of the child. (TR. p. 124) While 
the defendant was in Phoenix, the plaintiff did have the de-
fendant's mother care for the child during the time he was at 
work or at school, but all other times he had the complete 
care of the child. He fed her, clothed her, changed her, put 
her to bed, and washed and cared for his minor daughter. 
(TR. p. 120-121). 
The plaintiff traveled to Phoenix at the end of Dec-
ember, 1967, and talked with the defendant in an attempt to 
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determine if she was going to return. At that time, the 
defendant stated that she was not ready to come back yet; 
that she did not know how long before she might even want 
to come back; and that she may never want to come back. 
(TR. p. 118) At this point the plaintiff retained counsel and 
filed this divorce action on or about January 9, 1968. The 
defendant still chose to reside in Phoenix, Arizona, until she 
returned on April 14, 1968, more than five and one-half 
months after she had departed. 
The defendant's statement of fact setting forth the 
legal proceedings before the trial court is essentially correct. 
PLAINTIFF'S POSITION 
The trial court's decision should be affirmed and the 
plaintiff should retain custody of his daughter who has been 
in his care, custody, and control since November 2, 1967, for 
the following reasons: 
1. This was an action for divorce and not one for 
separation, therefore, the provisions of 30-3-5 UCA, 1953, 
controlled and directed the trial court with respect to what 
orders it made in relation to the custody of the child. The 
court could, therefore, make any order in relation to the child 
concerned as it found to be equitable. The provisions of 
30-3-10 UCA, 1953, which apply to cases involving separation 
did not apply and the plaintiff was not, therefore, under the 
burden to rrove that the defendant was an immoral, imcom-
petent, or otherwise improper person. 
2. Even if the provisions of 30-3-10 UCA, 1953, were 
held to be controlling, or of considerable weight, in providing 
the proper standard for determining which parent should re-
ceive the care, custody, and control of the minor child of the 
parties, the plaintiff presented to the court sufficient evidence 
to sustain the court's findings of fact that the defendant was 
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an unfit and improper person to have the custody of the 
minor child. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT AWARDED THE PLAINTIFF 
CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILD BECAUSE THE EVID-
ENCE INDICATED THAT SUCH AN A WARD OF CUSTODY 
TO THE FATHER WAS EQUITABLE AND IN THE BEST 
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD. 
This being an action for divorce, the trial court was 
authorized by 30-3-5, UCA, 1953, to make such orders in re-
lation to the minor child of the parties as it determined to be 
equitable and in the best interests of the child. 
The defendant contends that the plaintiff had the 
burden of proving the defendant is an unfit mother and that 
the plaintiff failed to meet this burden. This contention, if 
true, would mean that 30-3-10, UCA, 1953, controlled any 
order of the trial relative to custody of children in divorce 
cases rather than 30-3-5, UCA, 1953. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Johnson vs. 
Johnson, 7 Utah 2d 263, 323 P. 2d 16 (1958) had indicated 
that in divorce proceedings a father may be awarded custody 
of a child under the age of 10 years without the necessity for 
the court to find that the mother was an unfit parent. Justice 
Crockett stated: 
"The question thus posed was treated in ex-
tenso in Sampsell vs. Holt, (115 Utah 73, 202 
P. 2d 550, 552.) wherein Justice Wolfe point-
ed out the distinction between 30-3-10 which 
by its language concerns cases of 'separation' 
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whereas Section 30-3-5 is expressly applicable 
to 'divorce'. It being, 'When a decree of 
divorce is made the court may make such 
orders in realtion to the children, * * * as may 
be equitable.***" 
The law with respect to this issue is well sum-
marized by Chief Justice McDonough in the 
recent case of Steiger vs. Steiger ( 4 Utah 2d 
273, 293 P. 2d 418, 420.) 
"This court has stated that a divorced mother 
has no absolute right to the custody of minor 
children * * * but the policy of our decisions 
has been to give weight to the view that all 
things being equal, preference should be given 
to the mother in awarding custody of a child 
of tender years, * * * and this view is based 
upon the oft-stated purpose of the award of 
custody to provide for the child's best interests 
and welfare.***'' 
"The instant case is a good example of the un-
desirable and impractical results that would 
emanate from adopting the view urged by 
plaintiff that the court must invariably, in all 
circumstances, awarding the custody of child-
ren under 10 to the mother unless she is found 
to be an immoral or imcompetent person; it 
likewise exemplifies the wisdom of the prior 
adjudications of this court that questions of 
custody are always equitable and that the con-
trolling consideration is the welfare of the 
children involved." 
The Supreme Court in the case of Ryan vs. Ryan, 17 
Utah 2d 44, 404 P. 2d 24 7 ( 196 5) where children under 10 
years of age were concerned, determined that there did not 
seem to be evidence to find that the mother was an immoral 
person, but determined that it was in the best interests of the 
children that the father be awarded custody. 
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The Utah legislature saw fit to pass two separate 
statutes regarding the custody of children. Section 30-3-10 in-
dicates that when parents separated, the mother of any child-
ren under 10 years of age should, 
"be entitled to the care, control and custody 
of all such children ... provided further, that 
if it shall be made to appear to a court of com-
petent jurisdiction that the mother is immoral, 
incompetent or otherwise an improper person, 
then the court may award the custody of the 
children to the father ... " 
On the other hand, the legislature stated in Section 
30-3-5: 
"When a decree of divorce is made the court 
may make such orders in relation to the 
children, ... as may be equitable ... " 
The Utah Supreme Court in considering these two sec-
tions has previously stated that 30-3-5 applies in cases of 
divorce and 30-3-10 applies in cases of separation, It has ruled 
that in granting a decree of divorce, the question of child 
custody is always equitable and that the controlling consider-
ation is the welfare of the children involved. f ohnson vs. 
fohnson, supra; Samesell vs. Holt, supra; Steiger vs. Steiger, 
supra; Walton vs. Coffman, 110 Utah 1, 169 P. 2d 97 (1946); 
Smith vs. Smith, 1 Utah 2d 75, 262 P. 2d 283 (1953 ). There 
appears a just and valid reason why the court should continue 
to observe the distinction between the two sections provided 
by the legislature. Under conditions of separation where the 
rights of the parties have not been fully determined the pre-
sumption that the mother should have the custody of child-
ren under 10 years of age, unless it is proven that she is 
immoral, incompetent or improper person, probably is based 
upon sound reasoning. On the other hand, when a divorce de-
cree is entered and the rights of the parties and the children 
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are finally adjudicated, there also appears to be sound reason-
ing that any order relative to minor children should be based 
upon equity, thus allowing either the father or mother to be 
awarded custody, with the prime and controlling factor being 
the best interest and welfare of the child. 
The factual evidence in the instant case which sus-
tains the trial court and indicates that it is in fact in the best 
interests of the minor child that she be in the custody of her 
father also proves that the mother is unfit and is an improper 
person to have custody of said child. In an effort to avoid re-
petition this evidence will be reviewed under Point II as here-
after set forth. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF PRESENTED EVIDENCE WHICH PROV-
ED THAT THE DEFENDANT IS AN UNFIT MOTHER AND 
NOT A PROPER PERSON TO HA VE THE CARE, CONTROL 
AND CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILD. 
The trial court considered this matter carefully and 
had considerable time to weigh the evidence and enter the 
proper ruling. The parties first appeared before the court on 
April 23, 1968. Subsequent hearings were held on June 17, 
1968, September 10, 1968, and September 11, 1968. The 
court entered the decree of divorce on September 24, 1968. 
The court had an opportunity to thus become acquainted with 
and to observe the parties in this case more than would be 
true in the ordinary divorce situation. 
The trial court did find that the mother was not a 
fit and proper person to have custody of the minor child. On 
November 2, 1967, the defendant left her husband and child 
and went to Phoenix, Arizona. She previously discussed her 
leaving with the plaintiff, indicating that she was under such 
stress, that her family obligations were getting too much for 
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her and that she had to get away, that she would like to go to 
Phoenix for a vacation for two weeks. (TR. p. 118, 1-6) Instead 
of returning home at the end of two weeks, the defendant re-
mained in Arizona until April 14, 1968, when she did return 
to Utah. (TR. p. 101, 7) The defendant had refused to return 
to her home although the plaintiff had traveled to Arizona to 
request her return on two separate occasions. He discussed 
this matter with her in Arizona on or about December 26, 
1967, and on or about March 15, 1968. (TR. p. 118) The 
plaintiff had also discussed this matter with the defendant 
over the telephone, and in one telephone conversation he in-
dicated that the baby was sick with a fever. He asked her if 
she wouldn't come back. Her only reply was, "Can't you take 
care of the baby?" (TR. p. 119, 18-25) When the plaintiff 
requested the defendant to return in December, 1967, the 
plaintiff stated, "I'm not ready to come back yet; I don't 
know how long before I might even want to come back; I 
may never want to come back." (TR. p. 118). 
The defendant had not made specific arrangements 
for the care of the baby while she would be gone for the two 
weeks, let alone the five and one-half months she was gone. 
The plaintiff had to make the arrangements for the care of 
the child while the mother absented herself from the home. 
(TR. p. 123, 22-30 and 124 ). 
The defendant testified that she felt she was losing 
the grasp on everything that meant anything to her, and that 
she thought she had to get away to find herself. She felt like 
she was losing all identity and that no one really cared too 
much about her, or what happened to her, or what she did. 
(TR. p. 5, 20-24) She stated to Dr. Jarvis, her psychiatrist, 
that, "I'm the most insecure person in the world." (TR. p. 39, 
5, 6) Dr. Jarvis stated at the hearing that this factor still con-
tinued with her to a degree. (TR. p. 39, 10-12) Dr. Jarvis 
further stated that her response in leaving her child and going 
to Phoenix was not a healthy response to the situation that 
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existed. (TR. p. 51, 29) Dr. Jarvis further indicated that he 
could not guarantee that the defendant would not leave the 
child and her responsibilities again if the pressures of life re-
occured. (TR. p. 54, 18-30) The defendant further testified 
that she felt she had to leave her daughter before her daughter 
rejected her too. (TR. p. 73, 6-15). 
Dr. Evans, the child's pediatrician, indicated that he 
had counseled with the defendant on many occasions. He 
stated that the defendant's performance in the last year, or 
last ten months, considering her capabilities, had been poor 
poor and that what the next period of time would be he had 
no way of knowing; except that the sort of illness that she 
rightly suspects that she has is not one which is easily cured. 
Dr. Evans stated that he was speaking of her problems as a 
parent. He indicated that he agreed with Dr. Jarvis that he 
could not guarantee that she would not have a lapse back to 
the condition she was in when he first saw her, which were 
described as great anxiety, bewilderment, confusion and in-
stability. (Dr. Evans, TR. p. 7 and 8). 
The defendant admitted that while she was in Arizona 
she dated other men. She stated that this was all so that she 
could "find herself." (TR. p. 99, 20-30 and p. 100) The de-
fendant admitted that she was in the presence of other men 
and had been dating the month prior to her leaving to go to 
Phoenix. (TR. p. 97, 7-12) The defendant admitted that on 
at least four occasions when the baby was 10 or 11 months 
old, prior to her going to Arizona, she left the baby and went 
out and stayed until two or three o'clock in the morning. 
(TR. p. 9, 1-8) The defendant further testified that since she 
had returned from Arizona she had been dating men, and 
some of these occasions even involved periods of time when 
she had the child with her for visitation purposes. (TR. p. 102, 
10-23). 
The court properly found that it was in the best in-
terest of the minor child that the father be awarded her 
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custody. The court found in paragraph 7 of the Findings of 
Fact that: 
"The defendant is not a fit and proper person 
to have the care, custody and control of the 
minor child of the parties; she having left the 
child ... and stayed away by absenting herself 
from the home and the child for over five 
months, and in other ways demonstated that 
she is not able to care for the child and is not 
a fit and proper person to have the care, 
custody and control of the child. That the de-
fendant is suffering from a great emotional in-
stability. That her absenting herself from the 
home was not for the welfare of the child, 
but for her fear of her inadequacies ... and 
that she would receive the rejection of her own 
child, as she felt she has been rejected by 
others." 
CONCLUSION 
While the court has announced the doctrine that in 
divorce cases it will weigh the evidence and may substitute its 
judgment for that of the trial court, the court stated in 
MacDonald vs. MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P. 2d 1066, 
(1951): 
"Nevertheless, this court should not do so light-
ly, nor merely because its judgment may differ 
from that of the trial judge. We adhere to the 
qualifications set forth in the more recent ex-
pressions of this court: 'that judgment will not 
be disturbed unless the evidence clearly pre-
ponderates against the finding of the trial 
court; or there has been a plain abuse of dis-
cretion; or when a manifest injustice or in-
equity is wrought'." 
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This rule is further borne out by a similar ruling in Curry vs. 
Curry, 7 Utah 2d 198, 321 P. 2d 939 (1958). This court in 
the case of Johnson vs. Johnson, supra, pointed out the valid 
reasons why it should not overrule the trial court unless there 
clearly existed evidence which preponderates against his find-
ings, or that there had been an abuse of discretion. It stated: 
"Due to the equitable nature of such proceed-
ings, the proper adjudication of which is highly 
dependent upon personal equations which the 
trial court is in an advantaged position to 
appraise, he is allowed considerable latitude 
of discretion and his orders will not be disturb-
ed unless it appears that there has been a plain 
abuse thereof." 
The trial court had the opportunity to observe the 
stability of the parties and to receive testimony from them on 
four separate days of hearings. These hearings were spread 
out over a period of five months, and the prime consideration 
of the court was the custody of the child. There is no evid-
ence that the court abused its discretion in awarding the 
custody of the child to the father. The ruling of the court 
does not manifest injustice or inquity. The evidence does not 
clearly preponderate against the findings of the trial court. 
Indeed, equity, justice, and the welfare and best interests of 
the minor daughter of the parties indicate that the trial court 
should be sustained in its decision to award the custody of 
the child to the father. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. DUFFY PALMER, of and for 
HESS, PALMER & VANWAGENEN 
40 South 125 East 
Clearfield, Utah 84015 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Respondent 
